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Abstract
Emek et al. presented a model of probabilistic single-item second price auctions where an
auctioneer who is informed about the type of an item for sale, broadcasts a signal about this type
to uninformed bidders. They proved that finding the optimal (for the purpose of generating
revenue) pure signaling scheme is strongly NP-hard. In contrast, we prove that finding the
optimal mixed signaling scheme can be done in polynomial time using linear programming. For
the proof, we show that the problem is strongly related to a problem of optimally bundling
divisible goods for auctioning. We also prove that a mixed signaling scheme can in some cases
generate twice as much revenue as the best pure signaling scheme and we prove a generally
applicable lower bound on the revenue generated by the best mixed signaling scheme.
1 Introduction
Background Emek et al. [EFGT11] recently introduced the following probabilistic single-item
auction model: An auctioneer sells a single item to n bidders. The item comes from one of m
different types, and the valuations of the bidders for the item vary between the different m types,
with the valuation vij of bidder i for an item of type j being common knowledge (or at least known
to the auctioneer). The actual type of the item is determined by nature, with the probability pj
of each type j occurring also being common knowledge. There is asymmetry of information in the
setting in one respect only: The auctioneer knows the realization of the type of the item, whereas
the bidders do not. The auction proceeds by the auctioneer broadcasting to the bidders a single
signal about the type of the item. In the work of Emek et al., the signaling schemes considered are
pure. That is, the signal is simply some function of the type of the item and in particular, there
is a one-to-one correspondence between signaling schemes and partitions of the set of types. After
receiving the signal, the bidders bid for the item in a standard 2nd price sealed-bid auction. It is
assumed that bidders are risk neutral and play the dominant strategy of bidding their expected
valuation given their signal in this auction. Emek et al. investigated the following question: To
which extent can the auctioneer exploit her informational advantage to increase revenue by choosing
the signaling scheme appropriately?
Emek et al. show examples where non-trivial schemes significantly outperform the two trivial
ones (which are: fully revealing the type of the item and revealing nothing at all). They show that
it is strongly NP-hard to compute the pure signaling scheme that maximizes revenue among all
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such schemes. Their main result is a polynomial time algorithm that finds a pure signaling scheme
that approximates the revenue of the optimal one within a constant factor.
Our Results In this work, we consider the extension of the model of Emek et al. consisting
of allowing the auctioneer to use a mixed signaling scheme. In such a scheme, the auctioneer,
after witnessing the realization of the item, picks a signal at random according to some probability
distribution depending on this realization. We show that by making this very natural extension of
the model, we kill two birds with one stone:
• We earn more: We show that there are problem instances (with arbitrarily many bidders)
where the optimal mixed signaling scheme generates twice the revenue generated by the
optimal pure signaling scheme. Also, we show that the revenue generated is never less than
B/2, where B = mini′
(∑
jmaxi 6=i′ pjvi,j
)
. We postpone to Section 5 a detailed discussion as
to why this particular benchmark is meaningful.
• We work less: We show that the optimal mixed signaling scheme can be found in polynomial
time, by devising a concise linear program describing this optimal scheme. While it is certainly
intuitive that linear programming should be used to find an optimal mixed strategy, we need
to prove several structural results concerning the optimal solution before being able to devise
a polynomial sized linear program in the present setting.
Discussion of the model We are aware that in the setting of Emek et al. (which is our setting
as well), having the valuations known to the auctioneer makes it is less than obvious why the
model requires the item to be sold in a 2nd price auction. Indeed, simply posting an appropriately
chosen price would generate more revenue. Also, the assumption about valuations being known to
the auctioneer is itself questionable (note in particular that there is no obvious way to truthfully
elicit these valuations from the bidders). To address this critique, we note that Emek et al. use the
complete information setup and the associated results outlined above as a component in an analysis
of a Bayesian variant of the setup, where the auctioneer is unaware of the actual valuations and has
to base her signaling scheme solely on a probabilistic model thereof. Our mixed signaling variant
can replace the original pure one also in this Bayesian variant and will increase its revenue and
decrease its computational complexity. (We believe it would be interesting to understand how well
such a scheme approximates the revenue of the optimal Bayesian auction in the sense of Myerson
[Mye81] in this setting, and suggest this as a possible topic for future work.) Another, more down-
to-earth answer to the critique is that a 2nd price auction is simply a very natural, well-known
and wide-spread scheme for selling an item and that it therefore makes sense to fix this part of the
setup when the main agenda is to investigate how signaling can improve revenue. In essence, our
setting allows us to give an exact quantification of the gain the auctioneer can obtain by optimally
leveraging her informational advantage. And, as discussed in Section 5, if the valuations are not
dominated by a single bidder, then our benchmark-approximation analysis shows that the revenue
from 2nd price auctions is comparable with the revenue of the posted price scheme.
Related Research Due to our setup being a variant of the setup of Emek et al., we refer to their
paper for an extensive discussion regarding works dealing with sellers exploiting their informational
advantage (dating back to the Nobel Prize winning work of Akerlof [Ake70]). However, unlike their
pure-signal scheme, our mixed-signal scheme has an alternative interpretation as a model in which
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the auctioneer sells m divisible goods to n bidders which have simple linear valuations per item,
by bundling subsets of these goods together (see Section 2.2). The problem of bundling goods,
including divisible goods, has received considerable attention in the economics literature (e.g.,
[AY76]) as well as the problem of auctioning divisible goods (see [BZ01, AC04, IK08] and the
books [CSSS10, Kle04]). However, our particular model does not seem to have been considered.
Organization of Paper First, in Section 2, we provide the details of our mixed-signals model
and demonstrate that it is equivalent to an auction model concerning bundling of divisible goods.
In Section 3, we present the examples where sending mixed signals significantly increases revenue.
Then, in Section 4 we show that it is feasible to devise the optimal mixed-signals scheme in poly-
time, using a polynomial size LP. Finally, we show in Section 5 that the revenue of the mixed
signal auction is at least half the benchmark B. We conclude with discussion and open problems
in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries – The Model
2.1 The Problem Formalization
In a probabilistic single-item auction with mixed signals, an auctioneer wants to sells an item drawn
from a known distribution (p1, p2, . . . , pm) over m types. There are n bidders that wish to purchase
the item, each with valuation vi,j for an item of type j, with these valuations being common
knowledge. The auctioneer observes the type of the item and broadcasts a signal to the bidders.
The signaling scheme is strategically chosen by the auctioneer in advance and is given by a map
ϕ : [m]×N → [0, 1], such that for every j, the auctioneer declares signal S with probability ϕ(j, S).
As we later show, the overall number of signals we send can be assumed to be finite in the scheme
generating the largest revenue, so we can assume that from some signal B and onwards, the function
ϕ is identically 0 (formally, ∀j and ∀S ≥ B, ϕ(j, S) = 0). We abuse notation and identify S with
its support (i.e., the set {j : ϕ(j, S) > 0}). We also alternate between the notations ϕ(j, S) and
ϕj,S. We denote Sϕ as the set of all possible signals, i.e. Sϕ = {S : ϕ(j, S) > 0 for some j}. After
receiving the signal, the bidders participate in a 2nd price auction for the item.
A pure signaling scheme is one where ϕ(j, S) ∈ {0, 1} for all j, S. The variant of the above
setup where the autioneer is restricted to use a pure signaling ϕ is the probabilistic single-item
auction with pure signals originally suggested by Emek et al. Let us repeat a derivation from
Emek et al. for the more general mixed case. For a fixed signal S, the probability of the auc-
tioneer broadcasting this signal is
∑
j pjϕ(j, S), and so, given that the auctioneer broadcasted the
signal S, the probably that the item is of type j is Pr[j|S] = pjϕ(j, S)/
(∑
j′ pj′ϕ(j
′, S)
)
. As a
result, given signal S, the adjusted valuation of bidder i over the item is E[vi|S] =
∑
j Pr[j|S]vi,j =∑
j vi,jpjϕ(j, S)/
(∑
j′ pj′ϕ(j
′, S)
)
. We assume risk neutral bidders, who follow the dominant strat-
egy of bidding this adjusted valuation in the 2nd price auction. Therefore, for signal S, the auc-
tioneer’s revenue is
max2
i
{E[vi|S]} = max2
i
{∑
j vi,jpjϕ(j, S)∑
j pjϕ(j, S)
}
.
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We are interested in the ϕ that maximizes the expected revenue:
maximize
∑
S∈Sϕ
Pr[S]max2
i
{E[vi|S]}
=
∑
S∈Sϕ
max2
i


∑
j
(vi,jpj)ϕ(j, S)

 =
∑
S∈Sϕ
max2
i


∑
j
ψi,j ϕ(j, S)


where the last equality merely comes from introducing the definition ψi,j = vi,jpj.
2.2 Equivalent Model of Divisible Goods
We observe that a probabilistic single-item auction with mixed signals can alternatively be seen as
an auction where m divisible goods are bundled and sold. The mixed signals are crucial for this
characterization. The alternative model may be defined as follows: The auctioneer wishes to sell m
heterogeneous divisible goods to n bidders. She has 1 unit of each of the goods (for example, she
has 1 kilogram from each of m exotic spices). Each bidder i has linear valuation of ψi,j for each
unit of good j, so bidder i has a utility of
∑
j xjψi,j if he receives xj units of each good j. The
auctioneer sells her goods by bundling several goods together. More precisely, she uses a bundling
scheme (S, φ), where in each bundle S ∈ S, she places ϕj,S units of good j, and then she runs a 2nd
price auction for each bundle. We assume that bidders follow their dominant strategy of bidding
their valuation for the bundle for sale in each of these auctions.
The analogy between signaling in the model of one good of m different types, and bundling in
the model of m divisible goods, is clear. Given a probabilistic single-item auction with n bidders
and m types, we can define a divisible goods auction with n bidders and m goods by letting
ψi,j = pjvi,j. Conversely, given a divisible goods auction with n bidders and m goods, we can
define a probabilisitc single-item auction with n bidders and m types by letting (pj)
m
j=1 be an
arbitrary probability distribution with pj > 0 for each j and letting vi,j = ψi,j/pj. Also, mixed
signaling schemes in the probabilistic single-item auction and bundling schemes in the divisible
goods auctions are syntactically the same objects. Finally, it is readily checked that the expected
revenue in the probabilistic single-item auction is identical (up to a scaling factor) to the revenue
in the corresponding divisible good auction. Therefore, finding an optimal mixed signaling scheme
in the first model is equivalent to finding an optimal bundling scheme in the latter.
As a result of the above, we allow ourselves the liberty to alternate between the two models.
3 Earning More by Sending Mixed Signals
A simple example where the best mixed signaling scheme outperforms the best pure signaling
scheme is the following. Assume it is the case where m = n = 3, the item is equally likely to be
any one of the three types, and the valuations are the identity matrix (bidder i wants only item of
type i, so vi,i = 1, and no other type, so vi,j = 0 when i 6= j). A pure signaling scheme is forced
to pair two of the three types, and results in expected revenue of 13 . In contrast, a mixed signaling
scheme may use all 3 signals {1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}, and declare any signal that type j belongs to with
equal probability. (E.g., if the item type is 1, then with probability 12 the auctioneer declares {1, 2}
and with probability 12 she declares {1, 3}.) Now, no matter what cluster {j, j
′} was declared, both
bidder j and bidder j′ know there’s a 50% chance that the item is of their desired type, resulting
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type 0 type 1 type 2 .. .. .. type k
bidder 0 m 0 0 .. .. .. 0
bidder 1 0 1 0 .. .. .. 0
bidder 2 0 0 1 .. .. .. 0
.
. . .
.
. . .
.
. . .
bidder k 0 0 0 .. .. .. 1
Figure 1: Valuations of an auction in which the optimal mixed signaling scheme has twice the revenue of the optimal pure
signaling scheme.
in a bid of 12 from both bidder j and bidder j
′. Thus, the auctioneer gains revenue of 12 with a
mixed signaling scheme, exhibiting a gap of 1.5 between the best mixed signaling scheme and the
best pure signaling scheme. By a slightly more complex construction, we can get a gap of 2:
Theorem 3.1. For any even number k, there is a probabilistic single-item auction with n = k + 1
bidders and m = k + 1 types so that the optimal mixed signaling scheme has an expected revenue
which is twice as big as that of the optimal pure signaling scheme.
Proof. Consider the auction with valuations as given in Figure 1 and with nature choosing the
type uniformly at random. A pure signaling scheme can only pair k types, so in such a scheme,
with probability kk+1 , the auctioneer gains revenue of
1
2 in the 2nd price auction for each signal.
In contrast, consider the mixed signaling scheme with signals {0, j}j=1,2,...,k where for every j,
Pr[{0, j}| type 0] = 1k and Pr[{0, j}| type j] = 1. Now, for every signal, the auctioneer gains
revenue of kk+1 .
4 Working Less by Sending Mixed Signals
We now turn to showing that the mixed signaling scheme generating the largest revenue is polynomial-
time computable. To that end, we construct a linear program, whose solution is the optimal sig-
naling scheme. In order to devise the LP, we provide several observations, leading the way to
formalization of the LP. But before proceeding to the LP and these observations, we introduce
some notation.
4.1 Notation.
Given a signal S, we denote w1(S) as the bidder which is the winner of S (the bidder with the
highest bid), and w2(S) as the 2nd highest bidder. Formally (recall that we identify S and its
support)
w1(S) = argmax
i
{
∑
j∈S
ψi,jϕj,S}
w2(S) = arg max
i 6=w1(S)
{
∑
j∈S
ψi,jϕj,S} = argmax2
i
{
∑
j∈S
ψi,jϕj,S}
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We call a signal S a singleton if |S| = 1. Whenever S is a singleton so S = {j} for some j, we
abbreviate w1(j), w2(j). Given i, we denote by d(i) the set of types for which the bid of i is the
biggest: d(i) = {j : w1(j) = i}. Given a signal S, we denote rev(S) as the revenue the auctioneer
gets from a 2nd price auction over S. I.e., rev(S) =
∑
j∈S ϕj,S ψw2(S),j , the bid of bidder w2(S). As
always, we abbreviate singletons to rev(j) instead of rev({j}). The overall revenue of the auctioneer
from φ is defined as rev(ϕ) =
∑
S∈Sϕ
rev(S). We break ties arbitrarily, but in a consistent manner.
4.2 Na¨ıve LP.
Our first observation is that the problem of finding the optimal signaling scheme can be formalized
into an LP, with potentially many variables. Assume ϕ∗ is an optimal signaling scheme. We claim
ϕ∗ has only a finite number of signals. The key observation is that the auctioneer has no need for
two signals S and T s.t. supp(S) = supp(T ) and in both S and T bidder i1 is the winning bidder
(w1(S) = w1(T ) = i1) and bidder i2 is the 2nd highest bidder (w2(S) = w2(T ) = i2). We prove
this observation rigorously.
Claim 4.1. Let ϕ be a signaling scheme, and assume that there exist S and T 6= S s.t. supp(S) =
supp(T ), and both w1(S) = w1(T ) and w2(S) = w2(T ). We define a new signaling scheme ϕ
′ by
“merging” S and T into a single signal S′, and keeping all other signals unchanged. Formally, let
ϕ′ be the signaling scheme s.t.
∀j, ϕ′(j, S′) = ϕ(j, S) + ϕ(j, T ), ϕ′(j, S) = ϕ′(j, T ) = 0
∀j, S0 6= S, T, ϕ
′(j, S0) = ϕ(j, S0)
Then for every bidder i and item type j, the probability i gets the item of type j is identical in ϕ
and ϕ′, and rev(ϕ) = rev(ϕ′).
Proof. The probability of i winning item of type j is exactly the probability that the auctioneer
sees that the item is of type j and then declares a signal S, for which i has the winning bid. This
clearly holds for all bidders but w1(S) (= w1(T )), as all signals for which the winner isn’t w1(S)
are declared with the same probability in ϕ and in ϕ′. The claim then follows from showing that
w1(S) also has the winning bid for S
′.
First, observe that under the signal S′, the bidders bidE[vi| S
′] =
∑
j vi,jPr[j| S
′] =
∑
j pjvi,jϕ
′(j,S′)
Pr[S′] .
Therefore, the order of the bids is determined by the numerator in the last term, as the denom-
inator is the same for all bidders. By definition, for every i we have that
∑
j pjvi,jϕ
′(j, S′) =∑
j pjvi,j(ϕ(j, S) + ϕ(j, T )), and so w1(S) had the winning bid for S
′ and w2(S) has the second
highest bid in S′. This allows us to deduce the first part of the claim.
As for revenue, it is evident that rev(ϕ′)− rev(ϕ) = rev(S′)− (rev(S) + rev(T )), and it is also
simple to see that
rev(S′) =
∑
j∈S′
ϕ′(j, S′) ψw2(S),j =
∑
j∈S
ϕ(j, S) ψw2(S),j +
∑
j∈T
ϕ(j, T ) ψw2(T ),j = rev(S) + rev(T )
because S and T have the same support as T , and because w2(S
′) = w2(S) = w2(T ). We deduce
rev(ϕ′)− rev(ϕ) = 0.
Following Claim 4.1, it is evident that the number of signals in an optimal signaling scheme can
be upper bounded by all possible subsets of types and pairs of bidders, so |S| ≤ 2mn2. Furthermore,
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constraining i1 to the be the winning bidder and i2 to be the second highest bidder for signal S,
is simply a linear constraints. Therefore, by having a variable per signal and a pair of winning
bidders, we get that the optimal signaling scheme is the solution for the following (exponential)
LP:
max
∑
S⊂[m]
∑
i1 6=i2
∑
j∈S
xj(S, i1, i2) ψi2,j (1)
under constraints:
∀S,∀i1 6= i2, ∀i 6= i1, i2
∑
j
xj(S, i1, i2) ψi1,j ≥
∑
j∈S
xj(S, i1, i2) ψi,j
∑
j
xj(S, i1, i2) ψi2,j ≥
∑
j∈S
xj(S, i1, i2) ψi,j (2)
∀S,∀i1 6= i2,
∑
j
xj(S, i1, i2) ψi1,j ≥
∑
j∈S
xj(S, i1, i2) ψi2,j (3)
∀j,
∑
S:j∈S
∑
i1 6=i2
xj(S, i1, i2) ≤ 1
∀S,∀i1 6= i2, xj(S, i1, i2) ≥ 0
Where the constraints in (2) assure i1 and i2 are the two highest bidders for S, and the constraint
in (3) assures i1 wins for S. The last two constraints assure ϕ indeed induces a probability for
every j.
Therefore, our goal in the remainder of this section is to show that the number of variables
in the LP (1) can be reduced to a polynomial number. We comment that the same principals as
in the proof of Claim 4.1 will be repeatedly applied in future claims. From now on, we omit the
rigorous description of ϕ′, and merely refer to ϕ′ as the result of merging signals into a single signal
/ splitting a single signal into multiple signals.
4.3 Reducing the Number of Variables in the LP.
Our goal is to show that the number of subsets we need to consider in the abovementioned LP can
be reduced to a number polynomial in n and m. To show this, we follow a series of observations.
In order to bound the number of signals needed, we’d ideally like to show that every signal can
be split. That is, we would like to take any non-singleton signal S in ϕ∗, and have the auctioneer
declare a few signals of smaller support rather than declaring S. If such a thing is always possible,
then we can recursively split signals until we’re left with only singleton signals.
Definition 4.2. Given a signaling scheme ϕ, we call a signal S ∈ Sϕ splittable if there exists
a partition S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ . . . ∪ St s.t.
∑t
k=1 rev(Sk) ≥ rev(S). We call a signal singleton-
splittable if the signal is splittable w.r.t the partition of the signal into |S| singleton signals, that is∑
j∈S rev(j) ≥ rev(S).
Unfortunately, the existence of such a split is not always possible – some signals are non-
splittable. Our claims characterize exactly the cases where this split causes the auctioneer to lose
revenue.
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Claim 4.3. Let S be a signal in the optimal signaling scheme, which is not singleton splittable.
That is, rev(S) >
∑
j∈S ϕj,S rev(j). Then both w1(S) and w2(S) belong to the set of bidders that
win the items of S: {w1(j) : j ∈ S}.
Proof. Assume that w1(S) does not belong to the set {w1(j) : j ∈ S}. It follows that for every j,
the 2nd highest bid cannot be smaller than the bid of the w1(S), and so we achieve the contradiction∑
j∈S
ϕj,S rev(j) ≥
∑
j∈S
ϕj,S ψw1(S),j ≥
∑
j∈S
ϕj,S ψw2(S),j = rev(S)
Similarly, if w2(S) isn’t a winner for some j ∈ S, then for any j we have that the bid of the
bidder w2(j) is no less than the bid of w2(S). The inequality follows:
∑
j∈S ϕj,S rev(j) ≥∑
j∈S ϕj,S ψw2(S),j = rev(S).
The proof of Claim 4.3 gives the following as an immediate corollary.
Corollary 4.4. Let S be a signal s.t. the set {w1(j) : j ∈ S} contains a single bidder. Then S is
singleton-splittable.
Proof. If S wasn’t singleton-splittable, then the set {w1(j) : j ∈ S} would contain at least two
distinct bidders.
Corollary 4.4 allows us to deduce that the non-splittable signals must contain at least two
distinct bidders in their set of winners. We next show that non-splittable signals must contain at
most two distinct bidders in this set.
Claim 4.5. There does not exist a non-splittable signal S with |{w1(j) : j ∈ S}| ≥ 3.
Proof. Assume the existence of a non-splittable signal S with a set of winners, {w1(j)}j∈S , con-
taining at least 3 distinct bidders. From Claim 4.3 we know w1(S), w2(S) belong to this set,
and wlog we denote them simply as bidders 1 = w1(S) and 2 = w2(S). This allows to denote
rev(S) =
∑
j∈S ψ2,jϕ(j, S), where the winning bid for S is
∑
j∈S ψ1,jϕ(j, S). We now show S is
splittable.
Let us denote the following two disjoint subsets: S1 = S ∩ d(1), S2 = S ∩ d(2), i.e., the set of
types in S that bidder 1 (resp., bidder 2) covet the most. Observe that by assumption, some types
in S are not in S1 ∪ S2, so we can consider the partition S =
(
S1 ∪ S2
)
∪
⋃
j∈S\(S1∪S2)
{j}. I.e., we
partition S into |S \ (S1 ∪ S2)| + 1 signals: |S \ (S1 ∪ S2)| singleton signals, and one signal for all
types in S1 ∪ S2.
First, we consider the revenue of the auctioneer from the singleton signals:
∑
j /∈S1∪S2
rev(j).
On all such types j, neither bidder 1 nor bidder 2 have the highest bid, so the 2nd highest bid is
at least as high as the bid of bidder 1 and the bid of bidder 2. Therefore, on S \ (S1 ∪ S2), the
auctioneer’s revenue is∑
j /∈S1∪S2
rev(j) ≥ max{
∑
j∈S\(S1∪S2)
ϕj,Sψ1,j ,
∑
j∈S\(S1∪S2)
ϕj,Sψ2,j}
Now we consider the revenue of the auctioneer from the signal S1 ∪ S2, where at least one of
the bidders {1, 2} doesn’t have the winning bid. Therefore, the 2nd highest bid is at least as high
as the bid of bidder 1 or the bid of bidder 2. As a result, rev(S1 ∪ S2) ≥
∑
j∈S1∪S2
ϕ(j, S)ψ1,j
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or rev(S1 ∪ S2) ≥
∑
j∈S1∪S2
ϕ(j, S)ψ2,j . It follows that the abovementioned partition of S has
revenue which is either rev(S1 ∪ S2) +
∑
j∈S\(S1∪S2)
rev(j) ≥
∑
j∈S ϕ(j, S)ψ1,j or rev(S1 ∪ S2) +∑
j∈S\(S1∪S2)
rev(j) ≥
∑
j∈S ϕ(j, S)ψ2,j . Observe that
∑
j∈S ϕ(j, S)ψ1,j is the winning bid of S,
so
∑
j∈S ϕ(j, S)ψ1,j ≥
∑
j∈S ϕ(j, S)ψ2,j = rev(S), and deduce that in any case rev(S1 ∪ S2) +∑
j∈S\(S1∪S2)
rev(j) ≥ rev(S). Contradiction.
Combining Corollary 4.4 and Claim 4.5 we deduce the following.
Corollary 4.6. Let S be a non-splittable signal in ϕ∗. Then {w1(j) : j ∈ S} = {w1(S), w2(S)},
otherwise denoted as supp(S) ⊂ d(w1(S)) ∪ d(w2(S)).
Using Corollary 4.6 we deduce the existence of an optimal signaling scheme with exactly two
types of signals: either singleton signals, or non-splittable signals. Now, using Claim 4.1 we can
take any two non-splittable signals S, T such that w1(S) = w1(T ) and that w2(S) = w2(T ) and
merge them. This follows from the fact that we can always think of S and T as two signals over
d(w1(S)) ∪ d(w2(S)), with some elements have 0 probability of declaring S (or T ).
Using 4.3, 4.6 and , we deduce that there exists a signaling scheme that has at most m+n(n−1)
different signals: the singleton signals, and the signals composed from pairing d(i) and d(i′) for
any two bidders i, i′. Observe that d(1), d(2), . . . , d(n) partition the m different types into disjoint
sets, so there can only be min{m,n} such elements in the partition. We therefore deduce that
the optimal signaling scheme has at most N = m + min{m(m − 1), n(n − 1)} ≤ m2 signals. We
can therefore reduce our LP to have N variables: variables xj , indicating the probability that
the auctioneer sees item of type j and declares the singleton cluster {j}; and variables yj(i1, i2),
indicating the probability that the auctioneer sees item of type j ∈ d(i1) ∪ d(i2) and declares a
signal in which i1 has the highest bid, and i2 has the second highest bid. Formally, we solve:
max
∑
j
xj ψw2(j),j +
∑
i1
∑
i2 6=i1
∑
j∈d(i1)∪d(i2)
yj(i1, i2) ψi2,j (4)
under constraints:
∀i1, ∀i2 6= i1,
∑
j∈d(i1)∪d(i2)
yj(i1, i2) ψi1,j ≥
∑
j∈d(i1)∪d(i2)
yj(i1, i2) ψi2,j
∀i1, ∀i2 6= i1, and i 6= i1, i2,
∑
j∈d(i1)∪d(i2)
yj(i1, i2) ψi1,j ≥
∑
j∈d(i1)∪d(i2)
yj(i1, i2) ψi,j
∑
j∈d(i1)∪d(i2)
yj(i1, i2) ψi2,j ≥
∑
j∈d(i1)∪d(i2)
yj(i1, i2) ψi,j
∀j, xj +
∑
i1
∑
i2 6=i1
s.t. j∈d(i1)∪d(i2)
yj(i1, i2) ≤ 1
∀j, ∀i1, ∀i2 6= i1, xj ≥ 0, yj(i1, i2) ≥ 0
4.4 An Additional Observation
Note that for every i1 6= i2 and every j ∈ d(i1) ∪ d(i2), we have two y-variables in the LP (4), one
for i1 winning and i2 coming second, and one for i2 winning and i1. We now show that it is enough
to use just one variable, indicating a signal in which both i1 and i2 give the highest bid.
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Observation 4.7. There exists an optimal signaling scheme, in which for each non-singleton signal
S, the first and the second highest bid are identical.
Proof. Assume that for a certain signal S, the bid of w1(S) is strictly greater than the bid of w2(S).
Wlog, denote bidder 1 as w1(S) and bidder 2 as w2(S). We split S into two disjoint, non-empty
sets S1 = S ∩ d(1) and S2 = S ∩ d(2). (If either S1 or S2 are empty, then Corollary 4.4 shows S
can be split into singleton signals.) Define
g =
∑
j∈S2
ϕj,S (ψ2,j − ψ1,j)∑
j∈S1
ϕj,S (ψ1,j − ψ2,j)
(Note, both the numerator and the denominator or positive.) By assumption, we have∑
j∈S
ϕ(j, S) ψ1,j >
∑
j∈S
ϕ(j, S) ψ2,j ⇔
∑
j∈S1
ϕj,S ψ1,j +
∑
j∈S2
ϕj,S ψ1,j >
∑
j∈S2
ϕj,S ψ2,j +
∑
j∈S2
ϕj,S ψ2,j ⇔
∑
j∈S1
ϕj,S (ψ1,j − ψ2,j) >
∑
j∈S2
ϕj,S (ψ2,j − ψ1,j) ⇔ g < 1
So now, define ϕ′ to be the signaling scheme where for any j ∈ S1, the probability of giving the
signal S decreases: ϕ′(j, S) = g ·ϕj,S, and as a result, the probability of giving the singleton signal
{j} increases: ϕ′(j, {j}) = ϕj,{j} + (1 − g) · ϕj,S. In ϕ
′, the above derivation shows that the bid
of bidder 1 and of bidder 2 are identical. Furthermore, by increasing the probability mass on the
singleton signals, the auctioneer can only increase her revenue.
Following Observation 4.7, we deduce that the number of variables in the LP (and the number
of signals in our signaling scheme) can be bounded by N = m + min{
(
n
2
)
,
(
m
2
)
}. Furthermore,
Observation 4.7 justifies the fact that we repeatedly identify a signal with its support.
5 Competitiveness Against a Benchmark
We show a lower bound for the revenue against a benchmark, and first discuss which benchmarks
are reasonable. It is quite clear, especially when viewed as selling m divisible goods, that the
auctioneer cannot get more than
∑
j maxi ψi,j. As we are restricted to run a 2nd price auction
in the end, this quantity is in general unapproachable, since some bidder might have valuations
that are so high that they overshadow all other valuations of all other bidders. We thus define our
benchmark as the outcome of “taking a bidder out of the picture”. That is, we ignore the bids of
i′, and sum the maximum bid for each type separately. Formally,
B = min
i′

∑
j
max
i 6=i′
ψi,j

 = min
i′

 ∑
j∈d(i′)
max2
i
ψi,j +
∑
j /∈d(i′)
max
i
ψi,j


Before showing our algorithm is competitive with B, let us first discuss the motivation for
this benchmark. A classical benchmark for comparison in other prior-free settings is the one the
results from omitting the bidder with the highest bid (for the same reasoning mentioned above), see
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type 1 type 2 type 3
bidder 1 500 500 0
bidder 2 499 498 1
bidder 3 7 3 999
Figure 2: An example demonstrating that B and B˜ are different. B˜ requires we ignore bidder 1, as her bids are the highest.
B requires we ignore bidder 3, as ignoring bidder 3 results in the biggest decrease in maximal bids.
Goldberg et al. [GHK+06]. Therefore, one might suggest that the right benchmark for the problem
is result of ignoring the bid of the one bidder who covets her set of item types the most. Formally,
this other benchmark for the problem is: B˜ =
∑
j(maxi 6=i∗ ψi,j) where i
∗ = argmaxi
(∑
j∈d(i) ψi,j
)
.
First, observe that i∗ and i0, the bidder for which the benchmark B is obtained, are not necessarily
the same, as the example in Figure 2 demonstrate. But let us show that are closely related.
Claim 5.1.
B˜/2 ≤ B ≤ B˜
Proof. The inequality B ≤ B˜ follows from the definition of B, so we turn to proving B ≥ 12 B˜.
Denote i0 as the bidder on which the minimum of B is obtained. Obviously, if i
∗ = i0, we are done,
as both benchmarks are the same. So we assume i∗ 6= i0, and we have
B =
∑
j
(max
i
ψi,j)−

 ∑
j∈d(i0)
(max
i
ψi,j)− (max2
i
ψi,j)

 ≥ ∑
j∈d(i∗)
(max
i
ψi,j)
B˜ =
∑
j
(max
i
ψi,j)−

 ∑
j∈d(i∗)
(max
i
ψi,j)− (max2
i
ψi,j)


and since, by definition of i∗, we have that
∑
j∈d(i∗) ψi,j ≥
∑
j∈d(i0)
ψi,j then it holds that
B˜ − B =

 ∑
j∈d(i0)
(max
i
ψi,j)− (max2
i
ψi,j)

−

 ∑
j∈d(i∗)
(max
i
ψi,j)− (max2
i
ψi,j)


≤
∑
j∈d(i∗)
(max2
i
ψi,j) +

 ∑
j∈d(i0)
(max
i
ψi,j)−
∑
j∈d(i∗)
(max
i
ψi,j)


≤
∑
j∈d(i∗)
(max2
i
ψi,j) ≤
∑
j∈d(i∗)
(max
i
ψi,j) ≤ B
We comment that the example in Figure 2 also demonstrates that the 2-factor of Claim 5.1
is essentially tight. Now, having established the connection between B and B˜, we compare our
signaling scheme with the benchmark B.
Theorem 5.2. For any set of valuations ψi,j, the revenue of our signaling scheme is ≥ B/2.
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Proof. The proof follows from breaking the revenue of the signaling scheme into two terms: the
revenue from singleton signals, and the revenue from non-singleton signals. Given a signaling
scheme ϕ, we denote
revS(ϕ) =
∑
j
rev(j) =
∑
j
ϕ(j, {j}) ψw2(j),j
revNS(ϕ) =
∑
S: |S|≥2
rev(S) =
∑
S: |S|≥2
ϕ(j, S)
∑
j∈S
ψw2(S),j
We now denote ϕ∗ as the optimal signaling scheme we get from solving the LP in (4). Let’s fix S
to be some non-singleton signal in our scheme. So S corresponds to a pair of bidders, i and i′, such
that S ⊂ d(i)∪d(i′) and i has the highest bid on d(i), whereas i′ has the highest bid over the items in
d(i′). The revenue the auctioneer gets from signal S is exactly rev(S) =
∑
j∈d(i)∪d(i′) yj(i, i
′)ψi,j =∑
j∈d(i)∪d(i′) yj(i, i
′)ψi′,j. Therefore,
2 · rev(S) =
∑
j∈d(i)∪d(i′)
yj(i, i
′)(ψi,j + ψi′,j) ≥
∑
j∈d(i)∪d(i′)
yj(i, i
′)(max
i
ψi,j)
Summing up the revenue of the auctioneer from all non-singleton signals, we have
revNS(ϕ∗) ≥
1
2
∑
S: |S|≥2
∑
j∈S
(max
i
ψi,j)yj(i, i
′) =
1
2
∑
j
(max
i
ψi,j)
∑
S: |S|≥2
j∈S
ϕ∗(j, S)
=
1
2
∑
j
(max
i
ψi,j)Pr[Given j, ϕ
∗ declares a non-singleton signal]
=
1
2
∑
j
(max
i
ψi,j)
(
1− ϕ∗(j, {j})
)
(5)
We now turn to bound the revenue from singleton signals, that is, the term revS(ϕ∗). Let us
consider the following procedure, that converts one signaling scheme ϕ into a different one ϕ′.
1. Let j = argmin{ϕ(j, {j}) ψw1(j),j : ϕ(j, {j}) > 0}.
2. Fix some j′ s.t. ϕ(j′, {j′}) > 0 and s.t. w1(j) 6= w1(j
′).
3. Define λ =
ϕ(j,{j}) ψw1(j),j
ϕ(j′,{j′}) ψw1(j′),j′
(obviously, λ ≤ 1).
4. Alter ϕ in the following manner. Introduce a new signal Snew = {j, j
′} and set
ϕ′(j, Snew) = ϕ(j, {j}) ϕ
′(j, {j}) = 0
ϕ′(j′, Snew) = λϕ(j
′, {j′}) ϕ′(j′, {j′}) = (1− λ)ϕ(j′, {j′})
Now, the effect of applying this procedure on a signaling scheme is that revS decreases, yet revNS
increases: revS(ϕ′) − revS(ϕ) = −ϕj,j ψw2(j),j − λϕj′,j′ ψw2(j′),j′ , whereas rev
NS(ϕ′) − revNS(ϕ) =
rev(Snew). But now, because of λ, the bids of w1(j) and the bid of w1(j
′) are identical for Snew,
and therefore, just as shown above, rev(Snew) =
1
2
(
ϕ(j, {j}) ψw1(j),j + λϕ(j
′, {j′}) ψw1(j′),j′
)
.
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Given a signaling scheme, we denote Jϕ = {j : ϕ(j, {j}) > 0}, and Iϕ = {w1(j) : j ∈ Jϕ}.
It is evident that the above procedure is applicable as long as I contains at least two distinct
bidders. So, imagine we take ϕ∗ and apply the abovementioned procedure repeatedly, until it is no
longer applicable. (Note, every time we apply the procedure, we decrease the number of singleton
signals by at least 1, so in m iterations we must terminate.) Denote the signaling scheme which
we end with by ϕ¯, and assume Iϕ¯ contains a single bidder, i0 (the case Iϕ¯ = ∅ is even simpler).
Denote Jremain as all the types that appear as singleton in ϕ¯ (and obviously in ϕ
∗), and observe
that Jremain ⊂ d(i0).
Repeating the derivation from (5), we get that
revNS(ϕ¯) ≥
1
2
∑
j
(max
i
ψi,j)
(
1− ϕ¯(j, {j})
)
=
1
2
∑
j /∈Jremain
(max
i
ψi,j) +
1
2
∑
j∈Jremain
(max
i
ψi,j)
(
1− ϕ¯(j, {j})
)
≥
1
2
∑
j /∈Jremain
(max
i
ψi,j) +
1
2
∑
j∈Jremain
(max2
i
ψi,j)
(
1− ϕ¯(j, {j})
)
Since revS(ϕ¯) =
∑
j∈Jremain
ϕ¯(j, {j})(max2i ψi,j) we can conclude and deduce that
rev(ϕ∗) ≥ rev(ϕ¯) = revNS(ϕ¯) + revS(ϕ¯)
≥
1
2
∑
j /∈Jremain
(max
i
ψi,j) +
1
2
∑
j∈Jremain
(max2
i
ψi,j)
≥
1
2
∑
j /∈d(i0)
(max
i
ψi,j) +
1
2
∑
j∈d(i0)
(max2
i
ψi,j)
=
1
2
∑
j
(max
i 6=i0
ψi,j) ≥ B
We comment that if ϕ∗ or ϕ¯ contains no singleton signals, then we have rev(ϕ∗) ≥ rev(ϕ¯) =
revNS(ϕ¯) = 12
∑
j maxi ψi,j . In words: if the optimal signaling scheme contains no singleton clusters,
then the revenue of the auctioneer is at least half the sum of highest bids over all types. We also
comment that the example in the introduction, the one where m = n and the valuations form the
unit matrix, exhibit a case where the 2-factor in Theorem 5.2 is tight.
6 Discussion and Open Problems
We have shown that in probabilistic single item auctions, mixed signaling schemes outperforms pure
ones, both with respect to revenue and with respect to computational complexity. Furthermore,
Observation 4.7 gives us an insight as to the characterization of the optimal signaling / bundling
scheme. The auctioneer leverages her informational advantage to bundle goods in a way that
maximizes competition among bidders – her non-singleton bundles are exactly those where two (or
more) bidders are equal in their utility. In that aspect, our model allows us to precisely quantify
the extent for which the seller can shape the demand in order to increase her revenue (rather than
the usual concern of truthfully sampling the demand, in the non-full information setting). Needless
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to say, the notion that an increase in the demand leads to an increase in revenue is a basic principle
of microeconomics (e.g. [MCWGdCEiE95]).
Similarly, Observation 4.7 also demonstrates the connection between our signaling scheme and
the fractional knapsack problem (see [KPP04]). In fact, one may view the problem as a version of
the knapsack problem – for every pair of bidders (i, i′) there are numerous ways of bundling the
goods s.t. the bids of i and i′ are the same. The auctioneer is therefore faced with the problem
of picking a subset of these potential bundles (subject to having at most one unit of each good)
in order to maximize her profit. And, much like the fact that the fractional knapsack problem is
polynomial time solvable, so is the mixed signals problem.
Finally, we suggest some interesting open problems:
• Are there instances where the optimal mixed signaling scheme generates strictly more than
twice the revenue of the optimal pure signaling schemes?
• In Bayesian variants of the setup (see [EFGT11]), how well does the signaling + 2nd price
auction approach approximate the optimal auction (in the sense of Myerson [Mye81])?
• Is it possible to find an optimal (or approximately optimal) signaling scheme when m is
exponentially large? Consider the case where each type can be described using d attributes,
and the bidders’ valuations for the item are functions of these d attributes. Can one extend
the LP of (4) to handle such valuations?
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